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SW Notice
Chart

3 October 1975

TALKING PAPER FOR GENERAL WILSON

SUBJECT: USIB Discussion of Strategic Warning Staff
Monthly Report

1. As you recall the SWS Monthly Report was designed to sensitize the community to foreign developments that have strategic warning implications..

--The first publication was in March of this year, and the reference issue we are using today is dated 25 September, the seventh to be published.

--In the future we hope to include the SWS Monthly Report on the USIB agenda as often as possible.

2. In a prior review, the consensus was that too much attention was paid to so-called "small w" warning areas.

--This approach seems to have diminished in recent publications. Some overlap is no doubt unavoidable but does not appear excessive in this report.

--This latest issue, like the one in August, is a good report and should be commended for its focus on strategic warning.

3. Last month we prepared some recommendations for USIB discussion of the August issue--in hopes of improving

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the format of the Monthly Report.

--Unfortunately USIB was canceled and, taking advantage of good intelligence, the SWS was able to incorporate our "leaked" suggestions into the September issue. Specifically we think that the additions of both the introductory note on the title page and the byline are beneficial to the customer.

4. We would also like to note that some months back the SWS was experimenting with a means of conveying a "temperature reading" of strategic warning indicators.

--The chart in this current report (opposite page 13), on the likelihood of North Korean instigated hostilities, is an excellent beginning.

--We would encourage continued efforts of this nature-- perhaps, for example, the development of a technique to convey changes in the level of the overall strategic threat to the United States.

5. Although not directly related to the SWS Monthly Report, I would like to mention that I plan to convene a meeting of the Strategic Warning Review Group in the near future to discuss SWS operations.

--This is a fallout from DCID 1/5 which stipulates that the D/DCI/IC is assigned the responsibility for a working group to review the strategic warning process.

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--The names of your representatives have been provided to me, and they will be notified later as to the details.

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BACKGROUND PAPER FOR GENERAL WILSON

SUBJECT: Lack of Personnel Support to the Strategic Warning Staff (SWS).

Manning for SWS.

1. In DCID No. 1/5 (attached), dated 26 FEB 75, one of the responsibilities of USIB departments and agencies in support of the SWS is "to provide full-time, senior professional intelligence personnel to the SWS and other support as arranged by the Special Assistant."

2. According to a 3 MAR 75 memorandum from [] to the D/DCI/IC, a staff of ten analysts was to be formed. To date only DIA (2), NSA (2), CIA (2), and Air Force (1) have provided the requested number of analysts. DIA and CIA have also provided additional personnel for administrative support. State Department, Army, and Navy were asked to provide one analyst each, but none have as yet been assigned.

Reasons for lack of personnel support.

3. State. Mr. Hyland has expressed interest in filling the quota. State personnel have visited the SWS facilities to check on its operations, but no one has expressed a desire to accept the job.

4. Navy. Although Navy continues to say it is looking for someone to fill its quota, no one has been assigned.

5. Army. MG Aaron has stated that Army does not intend to provide a full-time analyst. He claims to have already provided the disbanded National Indications Center with Army personnel that have--over the years--been absorbed within DIA. Thus, he feels DIA should fill the Army slot. General Aaron has indicated that an analyst on the ACSI staff would be made available on a liaison basis. Aaron's position is complicated; [] can provide you with the details if you wish.

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Lack of Personnel
Support to the SWS

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/5¹

STRATEGIC WARNING

(Effective 3 March 1975)

Pursuant to provisions of NSCID No. 1, the position of Special Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence for Strategic Warning and a Strategic Warning Staff are hereby established.

1. Mission

The mission of the Special Assistant, with the support of the Strategic Warning Staff, is to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities with respect to the provision of strategic warning intelligence.

2. Definition

Strategic warning is defined as the earliest possible warning that the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, the PRC, or North Korea is considering military action by its armed forces beyond its borders, or is employing its military capabilities beyond its borders in ways that might threaten military confrontation with the U.S.

3. Functions

The functions of the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff are:

a. To carry on a continuing analysis of information and intelligence from all sources which might provide strategic warning.

b. When the situation warrants it, to issue strategic warning notices to the DCI, who will notify the President and National Security Council or take such other action as he deems necessary. The DCI will also transmit the strategic warning notices to the USIB Principals for further dissemination within their departments and agencies. When time is of the essence, the Special Assistant may issue such notices directly to the President and NSC with concurrent dissemination to the DCI and USIB Principals.

c. To make to the DCI (and in time critical situations laterally to other USIB Principals) such other reports on the status of strategic warning as the Special Assistant may direct.

d. To conduct and submit to DCI and USIB Principals studies and analyses with a view to improving the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to provide strategic warning and with due consideration for related work being done elsewhere in the community.

¹ This directive supersedes DCID 1/5, effective 23 April 1965.



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e. To arrange with appropriate departments and agencies of the Government for the prompt forwarding to the Strategic Warning Staff of all the information it needs to carry out its mission.

4. Community Responsibilities

a. The responsibilities of USIB departments and agencies in support of the Special Assistant and the Strategic Warning Staff are:

(1) To provide full-time, senior professional intelligence personnel to the Strategic Warning Staff and other support as arranged by the Special Assistant.

(2) To provide to the Strategic Warning Staff on a timely basis all information from every domestic and foreign source pertinent to the strategic warning mission, as is prescribed in NSAM 226.

b. The DIA shall provide the facilities for the Strategic Warning Staff, including communications, data processing, logistic and administrative support.

5. Composition and Organization

a. The Special Assistant for Strategic Warning shall be appointed by the DCI in consultation with the Director, DIA.

b. The Strategic Warning Staff shall be directed by a CIA officer appointed by the DCI. He shall be directly responsible to the Special Assistant and shall serve as his deputy for strategic warning.

c. The Strategic Warning Staff shall be collocated with the National Military Intelligence Center and shall consist of intelligence officers assigned from appropriate elements of the Community in consultation with the Special Assistant.

6. Review

The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC) is hereby assigned responsibility for the formation of a USIB working group to review the functioning of the strategic warning process and to report periodically—at least annually—to the USIB on its findings.

W. E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence

6 October 1975

The SWS Monthly Report

Attached are our comments for last month's scheduled USIB discussion.

We have the following comments to add:

Reactions

The Director, SWS has recently been informed that the SWS Monthly is read closely by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Director of DIA. On a somewhat broader military front the Monthly has received very favorable reactions from NORAD, SHAPE and PACAF headquarters.

Looking Ahead

The SWS is also setting up an efficient procedure to assemble, as quickly as possible, senior analysts from USIB agencies to assist the SWS in evaluating information deemed to be important enough to issue in a strategic warning notice.

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Prepared by OCI

CIA Briefing Memo

8 September 1975

The SWS Monthly Report

We have done no official consumer poll of reactions within the Agency to the Monthly.

We do know that there are many varying reactions to this new publication, just as there were to the former Weekly Watch Report.

We believe that it is important to bear in mind that the aim of this publication is to allow the SWS to look broadly at strategic warning problems and to discuss them in periodic publications. This is all within the SWS's new mandate, known generally as "Big W"--bearing on the danger of enemy military action against the US. The new monthly comes up with broad think-pieces on warning matters; designed to inspire comment and thought within the intelligence community. It steers away from the old current intelligence warnings on Big and Small W conflicts that we saw in the old Weekly Watch Report.

It also leaves the SWS more prepared to do any crash reporting--in the form of Strategic Warning Notices--that might be required in more urgent situations.

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We feel that the SWS has generally stuck to its Big W mandate, and that the Monthly is serving its purpose of prodding the community into thinking about strategic warning matters. We feel that the innovative approaches, such as the Bayes charts on possible North Korean attack, are useful. The recent thoughtful item on codewords as a warning indicator, we also found useful.

Staffing

We understand that Gen. Wilson may also raise the point that at the moment there are no members of SWS from State, Navy, and Army. We believe that we should support the thesis that the SWS can do its job more effectively with full support and membership from all USIB offices.

Other SWS Activities:

1. The SWS Alert List

The Alert List is turned out weekly, as an adjunct to the Monthly, in an attempt to solicit contributions, mainly from indications and warning elements in the field.

2. The Indicator Lists

The SWS pulled together a North Korea Indicator List for the community, and is pulling together several

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indicator lists on the EUCOM area.

3. The I and W Seminars

The SWS has taken a large role in organizing, with DIA, warning seminars including the various I and W elements in the military commands.

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